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This morning I shbuld like to talk with you briefly about our 
national defense. 
The first thing we should bear in mind ih discussing this vital 
subject / is that, due to changed conditions, we can no longer treat 
national defense as an isolated category, separate and distinct from 
other aspects and functions of oi+r national life. 
Today it is indeed true that "the front is everywhere." Our 
national defense capabilities are no longer determined, as in the past, 
almost exclusively by our strength in matters purely military -- that 
is by the power of our army, our navy, our air force, our weapons -­
put by the state of our total national strength .. 
For that reason, before I cyiscuss the purely military aspects 
of our defense picture, I wish to emphasize that we must at all times 
remember / that weapons and armed might alone are not enough, The 
Soviet Union is waging total cold war against us. It is the thinking 
of many of those who have studied the world situation most closely/ 
that the Soviet threat on the economic and diplomatic front is far 
more serious, far more deadly, than their military threat. 
I think it goes without saying that the Soviet Union, or any 
nation, would prefer to avoid the horrors of a nuclear war, a war 
which involves at least .§.2~ risk of being unsuccessful / and which in 
any event will result in enormous destruction$ So long as they can 
achieve their objectives by means of economic penetration, diplomatic 
victories, subversion -- possibly supplemented by "little wars," 
limited warfare such as that which was employed with success in Indo-
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China---, they have no need to risk an all-out military conflict with 
the free world. In fact, there is probably much more danger of a 
major warvs arising almost by accident, against the real wishes of 
either side, as a result of the tremendous accumulation of inter­
national tension that has been built up, than as a result of any 
deliberately planned surprise attack. 
Many-people seem to be unaware of the great danger to our 
national securityj'which is posed by this economic and diplomatic 
offensive of the Russians. We have been too accustomed to thinking of 
defense in purely military terms. 
Nothing would be more ruinous / than a policy by which we would 
devote so much of our energy and our resources to building weapons for 
militar defense / that we would neglect these other fields and permit 
the rapid spread of Soviet control through "peaceful" methods, that is, 
through the methods of the cold war. 
We would soon find ourselves in an isolated position, cut off 
from the rest of the world, and unable to service and maintain the 
elaborate and intricate military machine which we had been so busily 
engaged in building up. In a comparatively short time, we would 
become so inferior militarily vis-a-vis the Communist world that 
serious resistance would be out of the question. In other words, 
having lost on the diplomatic and economic fronts, we would find that 
our military position was hopeless also. 
We cannot withdraw behind a wall, or behind two oceans. We 
cannot run away from the conflict. We cannot at this time afford to 
pull out of Europe and Asia and Africa. By abandoning those parts of 
the free world to Communist totalitarianism, we would be doing grave 
danger to our own position. Even if -- I should say, especiallv if -­
we look at the picture from the cold standpoint of pure self-interest, 
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we cannot retreat to this hemisphere. 
That is why, in addition to maintaining our bases abroad, it is 
important for stable non-Communist (and preferably anti-Communist) 
governments to be maintained abroad. Every time another country is 
brought within the Soviet sphere, either by political subversion or by 
economic penetration, the balance of world economic and political 
power tips more dangerously against us. The more the balance is 
tipped against us, the more painful and difficult it is to resist 
the pressure. Finally, a point is reached beyond which resistance is 
impossible. The loss of certain economically strategic areas in the 
Middle East and South Asia to Communist control /might well represent 
that fatal point, beyond which the steady rise of Communist power 
would be irresistible. 
To maintain these stable non-Communist governments, so vital to 
our own national security, requires a sound, alert and aggressive 
diplomatic effort. It is tragic to think of what we have already lost, 
since 1945, through diplomatic failure -- especially in the case of 
China. 
The maintenance of strong non-Communist governments abroad is 
also going to require, in conjunction with our diplomatic effort, a 
certain amount of military and technical assistance. Such aid should, 
however, be restricted to those nations which are firmly allied with 
us / or at least which lean toward us rather than against us. I cannot 
see any sense in supplying arms, money, and technical know-how to 
countries which are as apt as not to use these assets against us. 
Where those nations which are friendly are in need of economic 
assistance, as well as military and technical, I feel that this 
economic aid should be in the form of loans and not outright gifts. 
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Though we have tried to do so for years, we cannot buy friendship 
with gifts. ~ 
A great part of our foreign aid program up to now has been 
money down a rathole. To some extent, this has been due to maladminis­
tration of the program. There is no room for waste, fbr mismanagement, 
for a poor sense of selectivity in an area such as this. I believe 
that by revamping completely our aid program we can achieve far 
better results and yet cut the cost very very substantially. 
It is essential that we practice economy in this field as well 
as in others. If we do not, we are endangering our national security 
at another vital point. As I said at the outset, the state of national 
defense in these times depends upon the total national strength picture ~ 
and a very vital part of that picture is the national economy. If 
our internal economy suffers a serious breakdown, we could be defeated 
without the firing of a shot. There is a limit to what our economy 
can stand. The Russians know that, and have expressed the belief 
that they can destroy this country by forcing it to spend itself 
to death. 
We have tremendous tasks facing us on all sides. The expense 
involved is staggering. Obviously, at this time, we must supply 
without stint whatever funds are genuinely needed by the military for 
scientific research and weapons development. It should go without 
saying, then, that wherever waste and mismanagement can be found, they 
must be.ruthlessly eliminated, in order that we get every ounce of 
value for every penny we expend. I believe that it can fairly be 
said that the field of foreign aid is a field in which we can effect 
substantial saving and at the same time achieve greatly improved 
results. 
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The greater cutbacks, however, should come in our domestic 
spending. We are going to have to cut the fat out of the Federal 
governmentVs already-swollen domestic programs. We are going to have 
to halt the expansion of these programs. We as individual citizens 
are going 'to have to adjust to some belt-tightening too. 
Up to this point, I have emphasized the foreign-relations 
aspect of our national security, and also the national economy aspect, 
because I fear that there has been a tendency on the part of many of 
us to lose sight of the importance of these aspects. The reason for 
this is, of course, that public attention during the past few months 
has been so pre-occupied with the problem of defense from the military 
preparedness standpoint. 
This is, of course, the most immedietely urgent aspect of the 
defense problem. Unless and until Russia and the United States are 
able to harmonize their relations and attitudes, which is scarcely 
foreseeable today, it is vitally necessary that we maintain a sound 
military defense posture. 
And by this I mean not only in the missiles field but in the 
entire field of military preparedness, including the maintenance of 
strong ground forces. 
We know the Russians have 175 divisions in their ground forces. 
They have the tanks and other heavy equipment for JOO divisions. The 
Russians are not relying wholly on push-buttons and long-range 
missiles; they are keeping their ground forces at a high level of 
efficiency. 
I am strongly opposed to any cutbacks whatsoever in any phase 
of our military defense at the present. But if it is found to be 
absolutely necessary to reduce the division strength of our Army, then 
we should place increased emphasis on our Reserve and National Guard 
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programs. We can maintain six National Guard or Reserve divisions 
fo~ the same cost of one regular division. This is no time to talk 
of cutbacks in our National Guard and Reserve strength. If we 
sharply reduce our Regular Forces, and then hack away at our Reserves 
and National Guard too, we will be left with practically nothing in 
/ 
the way of ground forces. 
So long as we are strong, there is little chance of attack by 
Russia. As I said earlier, the Soviet leaders do not want to star~ 
a war which will involve any substantial risk of defeat or even of 
heavy destruction at home, especially when they can achieve their 
aims without it. But a war which the Soviet leaders would regard 
as a pushover would be viewed in a different light. We are in grave 
danger, and world peace is in grave danger, whenever we let our guard 
down, whenever our strength drops appreciably below theirs. 
It is now tragically clear that the Russians are considerably 
a~1ead of us in rocket and missile development. Despite our recent 
success in launching a satellite, the fact remains that we a~e far 
behind the Soviets in this field of development. Just how far behind 
we are is hard to tell. Dr. Wernher von Braun, our foremost missiles 
expert, who is in charge of the Army 9 s program, says that it may take 
us as much as five years to catch up with the Russians. I feel, 
though, that if the proper effort is exerted, we can catch up in a much 
snorter period of time. 
I do not think that I need to discuss in detail the status of 
development of the various types and classes of missiles. The public 
is quite familiar with them, so much so that the names of these fear­
some weapons have practically become household words. I will only 
point out that we are still quite a long way from having an operational 
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Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Neither the Atlas nor the Titan, 
both being developed by the Air Force, has yet been perfected and may 
not be so for some time. 
There is a device called the Snark which might be operational 
before that time, but the Snark is really a subsonic, air-breathing 
pilotless aircraft, vulnerable to interc~ption, and is therefore not 
really a true ICBM. 
Nor do we have an operational Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missile. The Army's Jupiter (not to be confused with the Jupiter-C 
vehicle which was used to launch our satellite) is not operational 
at this time; nor is the Air Force's Thor; though both should be by 
the end of this year, according to Secretary McElroy. The Navy has 
recently announced great strides in the development of its IRBM, the 
Polaris, but it will still probably not be operational for some tim~c 
In addition to the field of rocket and missile development, 
wl th which we are all fairly familiar, there are two specific areas 
in whicn our defense program is seriously lagging, and these I wish 
to discuss with you briefly at this time. 
The first is the matter of submarine development. Submarines 
~re going to play a tremendously important part in any future war 1 
not only in their traditional role as destroyers of surface shipping, 
but as mobile and elusive rocket launching platforms. Unfortunately 
we are peculiarly vulnerable to submarine attack. So many of our 
large cities and major industrial centers, and our capital, are 
situated either directly on, or near to, our long and easily access­
ible coastlines. Even with missiles of comparatively short range, 
think of the destruction which could be wrought by a fleet of Soviet 
submarines, strung along our Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts, 
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launching a coordinated and simultaneous rocket attack against this 
country. 
Due to the facts of geography, the Soviet Union is less 
vulnerable to this type of attack than we are. To come within even 
fairly close range of the Soviet social and industrial heartland, 
our submarines would have to penetrate the narrow waterways of the 
Baltic and Black Seas. Those portions of Russia's coast which do 
border directly on open sea, such as the Arctic and Kamchatkan coasts , 
are a long distance from any major concentrations of industrial 
targetso Nevertheless, industrial targets in some of the satellite 
countries, as well as the Soviets' outer military bases and air 
stations -- and especially their own submarine bases , would not 
be immune to this type of attack; and we should push our nuclear 
submarine program as fast as possible. 
This we are not doing. I regret to say that, while the Soviet 
navy has more than 500 submarines, ours has only 110. While the 
Russians are building a large number of submarines yearly, we are 
building only several annually. Thus the gap continues to widen. 
Another vital factor in our national security program is our 
Strategic Air Force. For over ten years, the bombers of the Strategic 
Air Command have been the free world's greatest deterrent to aggres­
sion; they are so today and, pending successful development of our 
missiles, they will be for some time to come. That this is true has 
been generally recognized by most responsible officials, including 
President Eisenhower. 
Yet, despite this, just six months prior to the launching of 
the first Sputnik, heavy reductions were made in the Strategic Air 
Command. Three months after Sputnik there had been no restoration of 
these reductions. 
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The S~rategic Air Command suffers from a shortage of B-52 bombers 
and has been relying heavily on B-36 9 s, which have been termed 
obsolete. The bomber bases are congested. Some units were actually 
grounded last year because of lack of funds for gasoline. Lack of 
funds has also hampered the Strategic Air Command 9 s training and 
maintenance programs. 
It is admitted on all sides that, until such time as we have 
perfected our missiles to the extent where they can be completely 
relied upon, the Strategic Air Command is vital to our national 
security. It is imperative, then, that it be kept in the strongest 
and most efficient condition at all times, ready for action at a 
moment 9 s notice. That this condition has not been maintained is no~ 
the fault of any lag in scientific development. Nor is it due to any 
failure on the part of Congress to appropriate sufficient money, for 
we provided every cent that was asked for these purposes. It is 
simply a case of almost inexcusable administrative failure, or, 
rather, of inherent weakness in the organizational structure of our 
defense establishment. 
Whatever part our failures in education and scientific studies 
have in our defense crisis, in a remote or indirect sense, the fact 
remains that the more immediate cause of our troubles can be found 
in the structure of our Defense Department. Harmful inter-service 
rivalry, duplication of effort, useless and time-consuming administra­
tive procedures, waste, and poor coordination have been prevalent, 
and have prevented progress which should have been made. 
The truth is that, back in 1947 when the structure of the 
military establishment was overhauled and the Department of Defense 
was created, true unification of the Armed Services was not achieved 
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in any real sense. The Editor of one of our leading aviation maga­
zines has recently summed up the result of this so-called attempt 
at unification, the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense 
Department which it established, as follows~ 
"The result was a hydraheaded compromise of military, 
industrial and political influences••• 
"The result was an economic monster whose hunger
devours the national income without assuring the 
national defense. 
"This intellectual travesty is represented to the 
American people as balanced power. In some respects, 
it is indeed balanced. It is balanced politically; 
balanced to usurp military leadership by secretarial 
bureaucracy; balanced to consume the tax payer; 
balanced to generate unrelenting interservice bitter­
ness; balanced to compromise every known tenet of 
military command; balanced to swallow the talents of 
great officers in all services; ••• balanced to waste 
manpower: balanced to assure the Soviet lead time in 
technology to the point that American conquest probably 
eventually will be accomplished without a shot in self­
defense. 
"But insofar as being balanced for the prevention of war; 
or balanced to secure the most defense for the least 
cost; ••• or balanced to lead the United States into the 
cosmic phase of the air environment, no contrivance was 
ever more ill fitted to its mission.., 11 
It may be that this indictment is too severe. But it becomes 
increasingly obvious month by month that the Defense Department needs, 
not any mere superficial streamlining, but a complete overhaul of its 
basic structure. True unification of the services must be achieved, 
in spirit and in fact. We cannot let interservice competition 
degenerate into interservice rivalry, jealousy and bitterness that 
impede our defense effort. 
With this in mind, I plan to introduce a bill which calls for 
a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of Defense~ This 
bill will strike at the root of many of our defense troubles; it will 
clearly establish responsibility for assignment of tasks; it will 
reduce decision time; it will retain civilian control of the defense 
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establishment; and it will promote economy. Under this reorganization 
proposal, the civilian control now exercised jointly by civilians in 
the three departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force with the civilians 
in the Department of Defense would be centralized in the hands of the 
civilians of the Department of Defense. The separate services would 
become divisions of the Department of Defense rather than separate 
departments within a department as they are now. On a level with 
these three divisions would be created a fourth service for research 
and development. 
My bill also proposes to create a single Chief of Staff of 
the Armed Services, to be appointed by the President from the 
military personnel of the Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff would be 
vested with the functions now held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the additional function of command of combined forces. The senior 
officers of the four divisions of the Armed Forces would, as a groups 
act as advisors to the Chief of Staff in all of his functions. 
In the interest of economy, I further propose in this 
legislation, that all items of supply co ri1mon to two or more of the 
four divisions of the Department of Defense, be procured by a single 
agency at Defense Department level. 
Another plan of unification is being prepared under the 
direction of the Secretary of Defense, who has said that he hopes 
to have it ready to submit to Congress around March JO. 
It is not my intention that Congress should enact any legisla­
tion along this line before hearing the recommendations of the 
Defense Department. At the same time, I do not feel that Congress, 
which bears the primary responsibility for all legislation, should 
sit back and wait for the Executive Branch to draft the law. 
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The sooner we can begin the process of holding hearings and s,i'ting 
ideas, the better we will be prepared to consider the Executiv1 9 s 
ideas when they arrive. 
I believe that a thorough revamping of our Defense Department 9 s 
organizational structure, such as I have just outlined, is a necessary 
first step toward the establishment and maintenance of a sound 
security program. 
But there is more than this. This is only a first step. 
We must overcome grave problems in the field of education. 
We must match the Russians in weapons research and development. 
We must preserve the strength of our free government at home, 
the free government that has made it possible for us to become the 
strongest and happiest nation in the world. 
I have faith in America, and in the American people. I know 
what our people can do when the chips are down. 
And let us make no mistake about it, the chips are down. 
Let us pledge ourselves here today to a renewed devotion to 
the American spirit of determination, so that we can continue to go 
forward into a new and exciting era. 
- END -
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